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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines one central issue: How has the U.S. Army improved security 
force assistance (SFA) design with the implementation of the SFA Brigade (SFAB)? 
Secondarily, it investigates whether failures at the strategic policy level inhibited the 
accomplishment of enduring security objectives related to the establishment of the new 
unit. To address this question, the thesis will briefly describe concepts of U.S. strategic 
thought that underlie the policy consensus to conduct SFA activities in fragile regions. 
This thesis will evaluate the innovation and adaption of the Army’s SFA 
organizations/doctrine, so as to determine how well it fits into a greater U.S. strategy. It 
will also critically analyze SFA policy and procedures in order to identify areas for 
improvement. Two hypotheses are proposed with a research-based evidence chain 
suggesting both are confirmed. First, this thesis suggests SFABs are being established to 
increase the warfighting readiness of the Army, reduce SFA burdens on U.S. special 
forces, and secure resources to meet enduring security requirements. Second, ad-hoc 
approaches to SFA by the U.S. Army up to this point were in fact a by-product of 
disjointed policy, large resource disparities at the departmental level, and an overreliance 
on military solutions. As such, this thesis concludes with policy recommendations to 
rebalance and integrate various security programs that focus on institutional capacity in 
order to secure gains made by SFA. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines one central issue: How has the U.S. Army improved security 
force assistance (SFA) design with the implementation of the SFA Brigade (SFAB), and, 
secondarily, investigates whether failures at the strategic policy level inhibited the 
accomplishment of enduring security objectives related to the establishment of the new 
unit.   
To address this question, the thesis will briefly describe concepts of U.S. strategic 
thought that underlay the policy consensus to conduct SFA activities. This thesis will 
evaluate the innovation/adaption of the Army’s SFA organizations/doctrine, so as to 
determine how well it fits into a greater U.S. strategy. It will also identify and assess 
existing weaknesses of SFA policy and plans in order to identify areas for improvement. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since 9/11 the U.S. Army has increasingly been involved in conflicts around the 
globe. The rise of international terrorist networks, indigenous insurgencies, and lack of 
governance in fragile regions coupled with the overwhelming costs of massive U.S. 
military deployments have signaled the need for a new approach to protect and further U.S. 
interests around the world. Building partner capacity (BPC), defense institution building 
(DIB), security cooperation (SC), security assistance (SA), theater security cooperation 
(TSC), and security force assistance (SFA) have become slogans connected to developing 
a variety of different activities that are meant to protect U.S. interests. There are many 
institutional stakeholders involved: The Department of State (DoS), Department of 
Defense (DoD), Department of Treasury (DoT), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
and the United States Agency for International Development (U.S.AID), to name a few. 
This thesis will focus on the DoD’s role in BPC—specifically SFA and the Army’s role.   
The U.S. Army has been the primary Military Department (MILDEP) utilized to 
build foreign militaries and defense institutions in order to establish long term stability, 
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prevent attacks on the homeland, and promote peace in regions thought to be critical to 
U.S. interests. The U.S. Army has routinely turned to its general-purpose forces (GPF) and 
brigade combat teams (BCT) to accomplish these missions; this thesis will investigate 
conventional military readiness shortfalls and training challenges due in large part to the 
overutilization of GPF for SFA purposes. To be sure, the U.S. Army’s methods at SFA 
have evolved over time and have been exceedingly ad hoc in nature—arguably leading to 
unintended policy outcomes and undermining the Army’s war-fighting readiness. 
While U.S. Soldiers effectively train foreign militaries and achieve tactical success, 
high-level policymakers and political leaders need to properly assess progress and confirm 
intent/interest alignment with foreign governments with which we partner to ensure these 
efforts have long term benefits. Implications of poor SFA policy and plans can have 
unintended destabilizing effects in fragile regions and can also reduce the overall readiness 
of the Army. 
The recent and tragic loss of four U.S. Army Soldiers in Niger has called great 
attention to SFA activities by policymakers at the highest levels.1 With SFA activities 
coming under scrutiny, the U.S. Army announced the creation of the SFA Brigade (SFAB) 
concept in February 2017.2 The Army will field six SFABs with the first two focusing on 
the Middle East and with subsequent SFABs activating and focusing on the Pacific, Africa, 
and Europe. As a permanent addition to the U.S. Army, the SFAB are intended to meet 
strategic objectives of the National Security Strategy (NSS).3 The full extent and 
effectiveness of the SFABs has yet to be measured as the first SFAB arrived in Kabul in 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, 2018, Oct 2017 Niger Ambush Summary of Investigation, Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, https://dod.defense.gov/portals/1/features/2018/0418_niger/img/Oct-2017-Niger-
Ambush-Summary-of-Investigation.pdf, 1.  
2 Connie Lee, “Senior Strategist Highlights Security Force Assistance Brigade Benefits,” 
InsideDefense.Com’s SitRep; Arlington, April 20, 2017, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1889700489/
abstract/D29D743CEA5B4ADAPQ/1. 
3 Lee, “Senior Strategist Highlights Security Force Assistance Brigade Benefits.” 
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February 2018 for its inaugural mission.4 As this thesis is written, additional SFABs will 
organize, train, and prepare for missions.  
Overall, this thesis will study the adaptions and innovations in U.S. Army SFA 
design with the implementation of the SFAB; it will also critically examine the strategic 
policies and procedures that aim to meet enduring U.S. security objectives. This thesis will 
outline the factors and causal mechanisms that led to this shift in Army strategy. The 
research proposes that vague strategic guidance and failures at the policy level have 
predisposed the Army to devise its own solution to SFA. The conclusions drawn from this 
thesis will attempt to highlight areas for policy considerations, U.S. Army SFA 
organizations, and future researchers alike.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The two overarching themes of this thesis, the U.S. Army’s adaption to SFA 
missions and potential failures at the policy level, converge in many ways. The purpose of 
this literature review is to examine current academic and policy literature as they pertain 
to these themes and to describe the strategic context of these missions. The literature review 
will be broken into two themes for appraisal: first, the literature review analyzes strategic 
policymakers’ assumptions and short-comings as they pertain to SFA; second, it will 
investigate how the U.S. Army adapted its organization and doctrine to execute SFA 
missions despite clear policy objectives. Terminology in this field can be redundant and 
confusing at times; therefore, it is necessary to briefly define key terms early.  
Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, Security Cooperation, was released in 2017 in order to 
clarify the security cooperation lexicon. The strategic purpose of promoting long-term PN 
and regional stability are supported by a number of programs that fall into developmental, 
humanitarian, and defense-focused assistance. Security sector assistance (SSA) refers to 
the whole-of-government approach as it mandates that DoS is the lead agency for SSA 
                                                 
4 Phillip Wellman, “First Troops Among Front-Line Adviser Brigade Arrive in Afghanistan,” Stars 
and Stripes, 22 February 2018, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/02/22/first-troops-among-front-
line-adviser-brigade-arrive-afghanistan.html. 
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with DoD, U.S.AID, DHS, and DoT in support.5 SSA addresses strategic policies and 
programs that engage foreign partners, help shape their security sector activities, assist in 
shaping “legitimate” institutions, and enable foreign partners to address common security 
challenges.6 The DoS and U.S.AID manage programs for PN developmental and 
humanitarian assistance. Security cooperation (SC) falls under the SSA umbrella; it 
provides ways and means to achieve national interests as it involves all DoD interactions 
with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions.7 Security assistance (SA) falls 
within SC and includes DoS-managed, and DoD-administered, combined exercises, arms 
sales, and information sharing.8 Security sector reform (SSR) is a program that a PN 
undertakes with U.S. assistance to promote effective public services such as safety, 
security, police, justice, and border protection.9 Defense institution building (DIB) 
comprises of advisory activities focused on the PN’s ministerial/department, military staff/ 
service headquarters, and similar policy-making entities to develop strategic and 
operational aspects of defense institutions.10 Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchy of the 
programs and which programs best link U.S. agencies.  
                                                 
5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, JP 3-20 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), 
www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf, I-7.  
6 Joint Cheifs of Staff, Security Cooperation, I-6.  
7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, Executive Summary, V.  
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, Executive Summary, V.  
9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, II-5. 
10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, II-6. 
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Figure 1.  Hierarchy of Security Sector Assistance  
Security force assistance (SFA) is an SC activity; it is conducted across the conflict 
continuum (peace through war), as displayed in Figure 2.11 SFA can be used to shape an 
environment, and is tasked with developing FSF capacity and capability.12 JP 3-20 defines 
capability as the partner’s ability to execute an assigned security task; whereas, capacity is 
the PN’s ability to sustain and replicate a capability after the SFA program is completed.13 
SFA activities are designed to “organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise,”14 (OTERA) 
primarily at the tactical unit level; ideally, SFA helps build PN’s capability to maintain 
                                                 
11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, II-8.  
12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, B-1.  
13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, I-2. 
14 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, II-8. 
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their own security requirements independent of U.S. involvement.15 In many cases, SFA 
must be sequenced prior to other SC programs in order to establish security conditions that 
enable more robust and long-term programs such as DIB and SSR.  
 
Figure 2.  Security Force Assistance and the Conflict Continuum16 
Copious research has been conducted by the U.S. government, think tanks, and 
academics alike to ascertain why in many cases, SFA misses the mark and does not produce 
lasting security in fragile regions. The results of these studies often lead policymakers and 
planners to request more equipment, more training, and more money.17 
In Building Militaries: Challenges for the United States, Mara Karlin explains how 
the U.S. trains and equips FSF with case studies from Greece, Vietnam, and Lebanon.18 In 
1947, the U.S. aided Greece to neutralize Soviet backed guerrillas. This effort was 
unprecedented as it included dynamic military assistance and strengthened Greek 
institutions; by 1949, the Greek military was fully capable of securing itself.19 The Greek 
                                                 
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, II-8. 
16 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, II-8.  
17 Mara Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 2.  
18 Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States. 
19 Karlin, 20.  
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military assistance approach is viewed as a success because it did more than just enable its 
military. While the U.S. was deeply involved in revamping the Greek military structure 
and providing SFA, it ensured external actors were diminished and, most importantly, 
refrained from becoming a co-combatant in the matter.20 The successful Greek example 
describes a mix of SFA and DIB, that is to say, U.S. efforts in Greece not only provided 
tactical level SFA, it also focused heavily on what today we refer to as DIB – a robust focus 
on ministerial/department level aspects.  
Subsequent attempts at SFA in Asia and the Middle East did not mirror the 
successful Greek strategy. In 1955, the U.S. engaged itself in South Vietnam to establish a 
bulwark to communism.21 In many ways, the U.S. reversed its successful SFA strategy; 
most notably it did not focus on improving internal South Vietnamese military affairs. The 
U.S. became increasingly distracted with external actors to the point of becoming a co-
combatant in a war that lasted for years.22  U.S. efforts in Lebanon failed in large part due 
to the U.S. building a Lebanese military that did not properly match the environment or 
account for influential external actors such as Iran (to Hezbollah), and of course, the U.S. 
became distracted by allowing itself to become a co-combatant and security provider.23  
In Anatomy of post-communist European Defense Institutions: the mirage of 
military modernity, Thomas Young proposes the problem to be political in nature. The 
inherent political nature of changing a partner nation’s (PN) institutions have routinely 
been boiled down as a military-technical problem and therefore often times leaves the U.S. 
military in the lead for reforms.24 This assumption is not only flawed, it is categorically 
self-defeating. After all, the state of civilian-military relations in the U.S. is fundamentally 
structured to ensure the military is devoid of political involvement;25 to request the U.S. 
                                                 
20 Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States, 63–64.  
21 Karlin, 65.  
22 Karlin, 65.  
23 Karlin, 146–147.  
24 Thomas-Durell Young, Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of 
Military Modernity (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2017), 165.  
25 Young, 165. 
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military lead the effort in SFA is ambitious at best. Karlin would agree with Young’s 
assertion: concerted evaluation of SFA missions shows that when the U.S. becomes 
involved in partner nation (PN) political reform by influencing personnel and organization 
from the top, while refraining from a co-combatant role, the outcomes will produce a PN 
military that can sustain its capability and capacity.26 
Young addresses the ability to gauge progress of SFA missions as undermined by 
weak policy direction, ambiguous expectations, and unhinged priorities.27 This problem 
can be viewed as two-fold: first, the DoD has limited capability to identify correct 
approaches to PN problems; second, SFA is void of a diagnostic to ensure that correct root-
cause problems are identified for rectification.28 The lack of proper measures of 
effectiveness often leads U.S. combatant commands (COCOM) to report tactical successes 
or other miniscule good news stories as grandiose achievements while tactical failures are 
not seen as what they are—policy failures.29 While ad hoc programs to assist fragile states 
are undertaken, it is striking to see that deliberate and mature programs such as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have no metrics to assess progress in defense 
reform.30  
Stephen Biddle identifies a classic principal-agent problem as SFA is utilized in 
lieu of massive deployments; this method is possible, “only if U.S. policy is intrusive and 
conditional, which it rarely is.”31  Large interest misalignments frequently exist between 
the principal (provider) and the agent (recipient), which produce difficulty in monitoring 
challenges and conditions for implementation.32 This combination leaves the principal 
                                                 
26 Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States, 194.  
27 Young, Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions, 188.  
28 Young, 189.  
29 Young, 188–189.  
30 Young, 188.  
31 Stephen Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” 
Daedalus 146, no. 4 (Fall 2017): 126, https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00464.  
32 Biddle, 127.  
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with limited control and promotes inefficiency in aid provision.33  As principals become 
more intrusive, the agent must be reassured; this often leads to a “moral hazard” in which 
the agent becomes emboldened to take advantage of the principal, undoubtedly leading to 
“agency loss,” or, undesired outcomes.34   
In “The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fabergé 
Egg Armies,” Jahara Matisek observes disconnects in the whole-of-government approach 
that create costly foreign “militaries that are easily ‘cracked.’”35 Matisek identifies the 
primary obstacle to successful SFA in fragile regions is ultimately rooted in lackluster 
coordination between the DoD and DoS.36 Despite the acknowledgment by U.S. Army 
leadership to Congress that a lack of basic institutional capacity and political willpower in 
some PNs undermine SFA efforts—tactical SFA remains the solution.37 He asserts the 
recent resource-cutting of the DoS and U.S. AID pose significant obstacles to stabilizing 
and reconstructing post-conflict regions in which SFA programs are deployed.38 The U.S. 
military (and DoD at large) are called upon to fill resource gaps left by the DoS and 
U.S.AID leading to increases in PN dependency on U.S. leadership—as their basic 
institutional capacity goes unattended.39 Like Mara Karlin, Matisek identifies U.S. foreign 
assistance to Turkey and Greece during the Cold War as a successful example; the 
containment policy effectively unified and resourced U.S. agencies responsible for 
building both political-institutional capacity and tactical-military aspects.40 Ultimately, 
Matisek calls for a complete reorientation of foreign assistance programs to correct the 
resource asymmetry between the DoD, DoS, and U.S. AID; additionally he recommends a 
                                                 
33 Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” 127. 
34 Biddle, 127.  
35 Jahara Matisek, “The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fabergé Egg 
Armies,” Defense and Security Analysis 34 no.3 (August 2018): 4, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14751798.2018.1500757.  
36 Matisek, 1.  
37 Matisek, 1.  
38 Matisek, 2.  
39 Matisek, 3.  
40 Matisek, 5.  
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“leader (or czar) to oversee military assistance programs, coordinating various instruments 
of national power in unison to achieve a specific strategic outcome.”41 
The institutionalization of SFA in the form of the SFAB is in itself a tectonic 
innovation for the U.S. Army, but it did not come overnight. The approaches utilized by 
the U.S. Army have been ad hoc and reactive in the absence of doctrinal guidance due to 
inconsistent and absent policy. This is not to discredit the efforts of the U.S. military, as 
they operated without joint doctrine for years. 
In Innovation, Transformation, and War, James Russell utilizes case studies and 
face-to-face interviews to examine how tactical adaptations lead to organization changes 
that ultimately transcend to innovative doctrine.42 The tempo of operations from 2004 to 
2006 were quickly outpacing doctrine development. U.S. servicemembers were deploying 
to highly complex operating environments with growing terrorist networks and 
insurgencies without doctrine to effectively prepare for the mission. Despite the lack of a 
unifying joint doctrine, Soldiers and Marines effectively adapted their techniques and 
procedures to counter the enemy and stabilize the area.43 With feedback loops established, 
tactical adaptions manifested themselves into organizational innovations as standard 
operating procedures were developed and a greater institutional knowledgebase was 
formed.44 Soldiers and Marines were therefore conducting impromptu stability operations 
prior to formal guidance from policymakers. As U.S. servicemembers performed the best 
they could with no doctrinal framework for operations, policymakers continued to fumble 
the doctrine problem. 
Bureaucratic politics led policymakers to disregard recommendations for increased 
interagency collaboration; however, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and 
DoD Instruction 3000.05 empowered General David Petraeus to craft counter-insurgency 
                                                 
41 Matisek, “The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fabergé Egg 
Armies,” 16.  
42 James Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and 
Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 7–8.  
43 Russell, 191. 
44 Russell, 192.  
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(COIN) doctrine for stability operations.45 Despite the DoD Instruction, some senior 
military leaders opposed the idea and insisted that “stability operations were just a subset 
of conventional ones and that skill in the latter had deteriorated…emphasis would shift to 
almost strictly conventional training.”46 Regardless of bureaucratic politics and 
organizational tensions from oppositional leaders, the U.S. Army quickly turned one of the 
first doctrinal manuals focused solely on SFA, FM 3–07.1, Security Force Assistance, 
“based on lesson learned from previous advising efforts…two primary audiences for this 
manual are leaders in BCTs conducting SFA and Soldiers assigned as advisors.”47 The 
Army defined SFA as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-
nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.”48 
Some variations of U.S. Army SFA organizations include the military transition 
team (MiTT), advise and assistance brigade (AAB), security force advisory transition team 
(SFATT), and regionally aligned forces (RAF). Contemporarily, the SFA concept was 
utilized in Iraq by establishing the MiTT in 2004.49 A MiTT was composed of an 11-man 
team with a wide array of specialties: infantry, intelligence, logistics, communications, and 
engineer experience that were assigned to an Iraqi battalion, brigade, or division. The ad 
hoc nature of these teams coming together coupled with no formal training or doctrine led 
to the MiTTs finding themselves overwhelmed, unsupported by local brigade combat 
teams (BCT), and unprepared for the task.50 Initial shortcomings of the MiTT concept cued 
the advisor surge of 2007–2008 that saw a boost in MiTT numbers and the addition of a 
60-day training program at Fort Riley, Kansas.51 
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Major Charles Jack was among the first to call for the creation of a permanent U.S. 
Army unit that would serve only to conduct SFA in 2008.52 He identified trends and 
weaknesses in the original MiTT concept such as a lack of formal training, size constraints, 
loss of SFA continuity, and conflicting missions between MiTTs and the land-owning units 
to which they are assigned.53 Stephen Biddle would agree, “a standard MiTT embedded 
with an Iraqi battalion had only 11 Americans… some ISF soldiers would only see their 
U.S. partners once or twice a week… infrequent contact made it hard to monitor the 
performance of Iraqi units well enough to ensure consistent professional behavior.”54 
Despite combat operations and advisory missions decreasing in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the requirement for global security remained a priority as multiple fragile 
states in Africa became breeding grounds for terrorist organizations and non-state actors 
alike. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) were created 
in 2009 with the task to support security cooperation operations in Africa.55 By 2012, the 
U.S. Army had great institutional knowledge from years of SFA experience and announced 
a new concept – regionally aligned forces (RAF). The main operational construct was to 
align one trained and ready BCT to each combatant command (COCOM). The RAF 
concept affords a flexible BCT to meet requirements in shaping operations that could 
prevent conflict and stabilize a region; furthermore, this concept maintains years of SFA 
knowledge and produces culturally aware Soldiers.56 The U.S. Army, specifically, its 
BCTs has maintained a high operations tempo in the realm of SFA that persists today. 
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Concerns about the U.S. Army sacrificing and misunderstanding its war-fighting mission 
in the name of SFA were voiced as early as 2015.57 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are significant challenges to ascertain why the U.S. Army has chosen to 
spend capital on institutionalizing SFA within the organization in the form of SFABs. First, 
years of high operations tempo have paradoxically occurred with DoD-wide budget cuts 
which have widely hollowed the force. Both have had negative effects on the Army by 
simultaneously reducing equipment readiness and exhausting the organization. Second, the 
U.S. Army’s organizational essence has always favored near-peer conflict; the return of a 
decisive action combat training focus has been widely welcomed as officers and non-
commissioned officers alike are incentivized for performing in this role—not SFA related 
roles. Third, SFA has historically fallen within the unconventional warfare realm, which is 
performed by U.S. Army Special Forces—not U.S. Army general purpose forces.   
Therefore, this thesis will examine the friction between an increased operations 
tempo and the resource constrained environment to examine how the U.S. Army did more 
with less. It will review factors and mechanisms, internal and external to the Army, that 
eroded the organizational resistance to SFA. Finally, it will inspect how Army special 
operations forces roles in SFA have diminished since 9/11, which created an SFA vacuum 
that GPF have filled at the expense of war-fighting readiness. My hypothesis is that the 
SFABs are being created in an effort to increase war-fighting readiness of GPF and BCTs, 
reduce the burden on special operations forces, and forge an SFA culture in the Army that 
enables it to lead in this enduring pillar of national security policy.  
The second problem underpins the first; my research did not originally take aim at 
policy but the problems are too glaring to discount. The Army executes its missions as 
handed down from policymakers; their role cannot be overlooked. As noted in the literature 
review, there is a significant problem when it comes to defining key terms in this realm—
confusion emanates from this problem and manifests itself in many ways. For instance, in 
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2006, Robert Gates was serving as the Secretary of the DoD and asserted, “in the decades 
to come, the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security…are likely to 
emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own 
territory.”58 He called for the U.S. government to “get better at what is called ‘building 
partner capacity’: helping other countries defend themselves.”59 It should be noted that the 
term “building partner capacity” is not defined or widely used in joint doctrine. As security 
assistance spans the inter-agency divide, key terms and definitions need to be understood 
by policymakers in both the DoS and DoD in order to ensure clarity of purpose when 
building governance and defense capability abroad.  
It became clear in my research that roles and responsibilities between the DoD and 
DoS when it comes to building foreign militaries can at times collide and energies from 
each can negate progress. As noted in the literature review, policymakers and planners turn 
a blind eye to principal-agent misalignment and constraints, and lack proper systems to 
measure effectiveness of these missions. Therefore, this thesis will review the policies and 
authorizations that SFA operate within and will seek to identify gaps in understanding. 
Research will center around the hypothesis that ad hoc approaches the Army took to SFA 
was a by-product of disjointed policy which likely persists today. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is intended to accomplish two goals to assess why the U.S. Army is 
establishing six SFABs and to conduct a critical analysis of the policies and doctrine that 
authorize SFA missions. It will examine SFA adaptions within the Army that led to 
innovations in military doctrine and organizations. Simultaneous critical analysis of policy 
will be conducted as they relate to these military innovations.   
This thesis will utilize government sponsored reports, think tanks, and Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) theses to examine recommendations previously offered to SFA 
planners. Some promising sources include: Congressional Research Service report, What 
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is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress,60 The Rand Group’s, America’s 
Security Deficit: Addressing the Imbalance Between Strategy and Resources in a Turbulent 
World,61 and Stephen Biddle’s report in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Small footprint, 
small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance,62 to name a few. NPS 
offers a wide collection of theses relevant to the topic: James Beal’s, “Mission 
accomplished? rebuilding the Iraqi and Afghan armies,”63 Zachary Hoover’s, “Building 
partner capacity: the science behind the art,”64 and Chris Odom’s, “Broken mirrors: tracing 
issues in building partner capacity.”65 This collection will undoubtedly serve as a 
launching platform for additional authoritative sources going forward.  
The underpinning drive of this thesis will critically analyze the role of policymakers 
and SFA planners. It will build on previous works cited in the literature review to challenge 
the assumptions, constraints, lack of effectiveness measures, and misalignments in policy 
that potentially lead to disjointed DoD and DoS efforts to build foreign militaries. This 
thesis will holistically evaluate National Security Strategies (NSS), National Defense 
Strategies, Authorization Acts, Presidential Policy Directives, and DoD-Instructions to 
determine if there is indeed a gap in SSA guidance that inhibits SFA. This thesis will also 
delve into security cooperation procedures at large to examine how foreign militaries 
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request assistance, request vetting procedures, and how the process unfolds at the tactical 
level.  
As this thesis is being crafted, the first SFAB is conducting operations in 
Afghanistan with follow-on SFABs in training or being outfitted. Research will stay 
attuned to DoD and U.S. Army after action reviews, Congressional hearings, and relevant 
white papers to glean insights on how the SFABs are initially performing. As a strategic 
studies thesis, it will primarily focus on the strategic environment, the policies that 
authorize and champion SFA, and the U.S. Army’s application of doctrine and organization 
to meet national interests. Special emphasis will be placed on the implications of failed (or 
successful) SFA and identifying recommendations for future policy, organizational 
adjustments, and future academic research. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
As a strategic studies thesis, the framework utilized will be big picture strategic 
ends which tie in to policy ways and finally, operational and tactical means. The first 
chapter of the thesis will primarily be committed to defining key terms, providing 
background, and introducing my argument. The relevance of my research question resides 
here. Chapter II will seek to set the strategic landscape by defining grand strategy, strategic 
visions, examining presidential doctrines, and contemporary National Security Strategies 
that emphasize SFA.  
Chapters III and IV will contain the vast content of the research question. Chapter 
III will critically analyze policymakers’ role in SFA by challenging contemporary 
assumptions and constraints in SFA, while also examining current policies and security 
cooperation procedures. With the policy analysis complete, Chapter IV will tie in the U.S. 
Army’s role in SFA as it balanced resource constraints, increasing mission requirements, 
and organization resistance to SFA. The research will determine if incoherent strategies 
and policies have sent the U.S. Army into a spiral of ad hoc SFA practices that ultimately 
culminated in SFAB creation and paradoxically may lead to the formations of new policies 
at the strategic level. Chapter V will tie the research together, draw conclusions, make 
recommendations, and identify areas for continued research. 
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II. THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF SECURITY FORCE 
ASSISTANCE  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Soldiers conducting SFA abroad, statesmen, and academics alike have often been 
perplexed as to why the U.S. engages in building foreign militaries. Therefore, it will be 
necessary to briefly introduce the criteria and visions of U.S. grand strategy that underpin 
SFA activities. This subsection of the chapter will distill the key frameworks of U.S. 
strategy to lay a foundation on which the arguments of the thesis resides, in Army adaption 
and strategic policy. U.S. national security documents are manifested from frameworks of 
U.S. strategic visions and ultimately guide policy. It will be necessary to introduce these 
national security documents, their origins, and the strategic goals that bring about policy. 
Finally, this chapter will describe fragile states and regions that are typically in the aperture 
of U.S. strategy and SFA policy; additionally, it will discuss some of the key problems 
associated with conducting SFA in fragile states. This chapter will serve the thesis by 
enabling a critical analysis of SFA policy and activities through the lens of these criteria 
and visions.  
B. HOW SFA FITS INTO U.S. GRAND STRATEGY  
Many theorists, statesman, military experts, and academics alike have debated the 
validity of grand strategy and the various forms it may take. The common denominator of 
these deliberations is clear—grand strategy is difficult to define and measure. Grand 
strategy will transcend generations and bridge the gap between Presidential 
Administrations by integrating the tools of national power: diplomacy, information, 
military, and economy (DIME). National interests drive grand strategy; the problem arises 
when the U.S. has too many national interests that could potentially undermine or cancel 
out each other.  
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Hal Brands defines grand strategy as the “intellectual architecture that gives form 
and structure to foreign policy.”66 Grand strategy is not foreign policy as a whole—it is a 
conceptual framework that enables a nation to determine where it wants to be and how to 
get there.67 It provides linkage between short-term policies and long-term (enduring) 
interests by balancing means, ends, capabilities, and objectives.68 Grand strategy is a 
process that constantly evaluates its subcomponents and remains flexible to adapt after 
reassessment.69 As it influences and is influenced by others’ behavior, grand strategy is 
interactive and exists in both war and peace.70 Brands emphasizes the importance of grand 
strategy by highlighting inherent resource constraints as it relates to DIME; expanding 
interests can cue new threats, and “overstretch is a constant peril.”71 
B.H. Liddell Hart defines strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military 
means to fulfill the ends of policy.”72 He asserts the true aim of strategy is to seek an 
advantageous strategic situation that can achieve a decision; if that fails, then war is only 
advisable if it is sure to deliver the desired decision.73 Even in the direst situations, “[T]he 
aim of strategy must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous 
circumstances…to produce a decision without any serious fighting.”74 Hart was amongst 
the first to call for cooperative institutions, “Frequently…European balance of power has 
become unbalanced…federation is a more hopeful method, since it embodies the life-
giving principle of cooperation.”75 
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Barry Posen and Andrew Ross outline four strategic visions that are commonly 
debated: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy.76 
Neo-isolationism calls for a withdrawal of U.S. foreign policy. It assumes that U.S. 
sovereignty is not at risk and that external threats can be contained by capable and 
proximate states.77 There are many risks associated with this vision. This strategy would 
serve as a massive reversal of U.S. and international policy by abandoning long standing 
security institutions that were established in the wake of two world wars – both of which 
the U.S. did not want involvement.  
Selective engagement calls for an appetite suppressant of U.S. foreign policy. It re-
focuses the aperture to great power politics and prevention of such wars.78 Balance of 
power and checking hegemonic ambitions in regions of greater U.S. importance are the 
only criteria for the U.S. to selectively engage. Ethnic conflicts in peripheral areas are only 
a concern if such conflicts have the potential to elicit a great power war; humanitarian 
interventions are only to be embarked on if they can satisfy the opportunity costs.79 This 
strategy is flawed in that it violates Brand’s criteria of establishing priorities. Selective 
engagement provides vague policy direction for when the U.S. will intervene abroad, 
making it inflexible and slow to match ends with means.  
Cooperative security would require the U.S. to leverage international institutions; 
ideally, like-minded democratic states will find it easier to work together through such 
institutions.80 The globalization of technology, economy, and security interests have raised 
the motives for great powers to collaborate—even great powers who are not democratic 
such as China and Russia.81 The U.S. would maintain its comparative advantage in 
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technology and would be capable of operating simultaneously in multiple theatres.82 
However, the collective action problem, free-riding states, and international institution 
credibility remain obstacles to true collective security.83 Undoubtedly, the U.S., with the 
world’s strongest military, highest GDP, and as the architect of these international 
institutions will serve as the best deterrent to defectors and aggressors.  
Primacy calls for the U.S. to get so far ahead that no one can compete. It relies on 
power and views international institutions as unreliable.84 Peace can only be achieved via 
unsurpassed U.S. power. This strategy disregards and undermines the international order 
that the U.S. established; Brands asserts that a good grand strategy “requires a clear 
understanding of the nature of the international environment.”85 “Combining all aspects of 
national power”86 would be undercut as U.S. diplomacy would suffer from potential 
counter-balancing (allies or aggressor), and the economic standing of the U.S. would 
become shaky as it overspends and overstretches militarily.  
Regardless of the debate on which image of U.S. grand strategy should be chosen, 
U.S. policymakers have pursued some form of engagement and assertion to form the global 
order. The center of gravity for the United States foreign policy over the last seventy years 
has been to secure an open and prosperous integrated world economy that relies on free 
trade and nondiscrimination.87 Efforts to prevent hostile actors from dominating Europe, 
East Asia, and the Persian Gulf have been the foundation of U.S. grand strategy since the 
end of World War II (WWII) and the re-shaping of the international order.88 Washington’s 
“most consequential strategic choice” was critical to pursue this goal; it included various 
overseas security commitments in the form of forward deployed U.S. military forces, 
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security cooperation that led to NATO, and U.S. presence and security guarantees in the 
Middle East.89 These efforts to shape and secure global order in ways that are favorable to 
the U.S. have yielded both positive and negative effects, re-opened the debate on U.S. 
retrenchment, and potentially given a platform for adversarial great powers to arise.  
Today, America finds itself in quandary; tensions from globalization and the 
international system ushered in by U.S. leadership has placed it “in an acute predicament 
with no obvious or easy solution.”90 The maintenance of global stability is central to the 
U.S. national interests as outlined in the most recent National Security Strategy (NSS). 
These interests are colliding with revisionist powers’ recent assertiveness and rogue 
nation’s nuclear proliferation ambitions – both of these cases have political and economic 
concerns for both the U.S. and its allies. Additionally, the U.S. maintains its commitment 
to stabilizing war-torn and fragile regions across the globe. If the U.S. were to impulsively 
overreact to each instability, competitor, or threat, it risks becoming overextended; if the 
U.S. signals an intention to detach from challenges, it risks losing credibility—such a loss 
of global confidence could cue an unraveling of the international order the U.S. has 
championed since WWII.91 This strategic predicament prompted American policy to 
center around what is known as great power competition in a time U.S. servicemembers 
remain engaged in SFA missions abroad. The balancing act policymakers now face is 
building tools of national power (DIME) while also remaining engaged with SFA to 
promote stability, American access, and influence.  
Policymakers and academics alike have questioned whether the return on 
investment of SFA is a net-gain for the U.S. and whether or not the SFA can actually 
achieve a strategic objective. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) explored the 
track record of SFA missions since WWII and extracted seven strategic goals the U.S. 
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sought to accomplish in the endeavor.92 These goals include: “victory in war/war 
termination, managing regional security challenges, indirectly supporting a party to a 
conflict, conflict mitigation, enhancing coalition participation, building institutional and 
interpersonal linkages, and alliance building.”93 As visualized in Figure 3, they found that 
SFA efforts are least effective when the objective is victory in war/war termination and 
managing regional security; it is most effective while building institutional/interpersonal 
linkages and alliance building.94 SFA efforts post-9/11 and the invasion of Iraq were 
categorically focused on counterterrorism and applied to fragile states; however, SFA has 
expanded since 2015 to counter Russian aggression in Central and Eastern Europe.95 To 
be sure, SFA is understood as a way to achieve the strategic U.S. objective of safeguarding 
an international order favorable to the United States.  
 
Figure 3.  BPC Effectiveness by Strategic Rationale96 
C. HOW SFA FITS INTO U.S. STRATEGIC GUIDANCE  
The most recent strategies have served to continue a legacy of U.S. military 
assistance that was championed after WWII. Following WWII, the U.S. became 
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increasingly interventionist abroad as the United Nations (UN) was formed and the U.S. 
attempted to proliferate U.S. institutions and democracy. The U.S. enjoyed economic and 
technological superiority that allowed the Truman Administration a plethora of foreign 
policy options that were previously unobtainable in U.S. history.97 The Marshall Plan 
provided massive economic assistance effort to aid in the recovery of ravaged Western 
European nations post-WWII. The Truman Doctrine was established to economically and 
diplomatically combat the threat of Soviet expansion and was largely motivated by George 
Kennan’s famous telegram and Stalin’s failure to comply with previous post-war 
agreements.98 Successful atomic bomb tests by the Soviets and the Communist Chinese 
revolution prompted greater U.S. action. In an effort to preserve the balance of power and 
the status quo, the U.S. worked closely with the UN to establish NATO. The first 
presidential doctrine that warned against being “entangled in European affairs” was 
officially concluded.99 The Truman Doctrine, along with the creation of NATO, were 
established to counter the spread of communism and Soviet influence during the Cold War; 
thus, the containment policy was born.   
While the Truman Doctrine originally leveraged diplomatic and economic tools to 
shape the international order, it took a more militarized approach as communist threats 
continued to develop. The National Security Council (NSC) mandated a new strategy for 
global Soviet containment.100 NSC-68 called for a “renewed initiative in the cold war;” 
specifically, it emphasized countries on the immediate Soviet fringe—not only Western 
European countries as previous policy covered.101 The NSC expanded the Truman 
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Doctrine by placing a much larger emphasis on military power to the tune of 20 percent of 
gross domestic product and called for bold action to counter the spread of communism .102  
With NSC-68, obscure regions on the globe suddenly became vital to U.S. security 
interests. It became clear in 1946 that Soviet influence would threatened U.S. interests as 
Soviet backed rebels established autonomous regions in Azerbaijan and the Kurdish areas 
in northwestern Iran.103 These crises cued an American emphasis in the region as Iran was 
“of vital strategic interests” because Persian oil would be critical in the case of a war with 
the Soviets.104 Central to the containment policy was the U.S. effort to build foreign 
militaries to act as a bulwark to Soviet expansionism—this policy has withstood the test of 
time and now serves as a counter to the spread of terrorism in fragile regions. U.S. military 
activities such as security guarantees and assistance are deeply rooted in the lessons of the 
Cold War that demonstrated that by providing for other nations’ security, the U.S. could 
effectively advance its economic agenda and prevent the emergence of military 
competitors.105 The strong interventionist language of NSC-68 has underpinned 
generations of U.S. military assistance that included supporting anti-communist guerrillas 
in Vietnam, strengthening and expanding NATO, and massive military spending that 
ultimately succeeded in the dissolution of the Soviet economy.106 
The end of the Cold War did not bring about the dismantling of this vision and 
framework, in fact, the U.S. military’s involvement in international affairs simply shifted 
from “containment to engagement.”107 The Clinton Administration’s 1996 “Engagement 
and Enlargement” strategy directed the military to engage with international partners and 
provide overseas presence.108 The strategy included support to democracies abroad, 
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economic assistance, and increased U.S. military assistance overseas to foster regional 
stability—the U.S. wanted to be the partner of choice even in the absence of the Soviet 
Union.109 The Clinton Doctrine directed the U.S. military to engage in dozens of 
deployments ranging from UN peace-keeping missions to stability operations missions in 
Africa and the Balkans.110 During the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush 
criticized the perceived misuse of the military and contended the U.S. should not participate 
in engagement activities; yet, the Bush Doctrine would ultimately enshrine these activities 
in the form of security cooperation.111 Even if criticized on the campaign trail, building 
foreign militaries has persisted and even enlarged through the Obama years and into the 
current presidential administration.   
The National Security Strategy (NSS) communicates the president’s ultimate vision 
for foreign policy in which the U.S. Government will pursue national interests.112 The 
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated the executive branch develop a yearly NSS to 
communicate worldwide interests and prioritize strategic objectives in order to inform 
Congress on national security matters and to secure budgetary funds.113 The National 
Defense Strategy (NDS), signed by the Secretary of Defense, is subsequently derived from 
the NSS; the NDS articulates defense objectives from the NSS. The National Military 
Strategy (NMS) is derived from the NSS and NDS; it is signed by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and describes the ways and means in which the U.S. military can meet 
objectives from the NSS.114 
The 2006 NSS heavily emphasized the need for the U.S. to continue to lead the 
world towards a path of democracy proliferation, spread of human rights, and the need to 
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crush tyrannies—it referenced Iraq and Afghanistan as champions of democracy 
proliferation.115 The 2010 NSS took this approach a step further by outlining the need to 
partner with capable nations to foster security, build capacity in post-conflict areas, and 
prevent conflicts from emerging.116 As conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, 
Syria, and Libya continued to erupt and give rise to more advanced terrorists networks by 
2015, the NSS took an ever more robust stance towards building partner capacity. The 2015 
NSS aggressively focused on fragile states and outlined the strategic importance of 
building capacity in these areas of world in order to prevent conflict, protect U.S. interests 
abroad, and suppress existential threats to the homeland.117 Following the lead of the 2015 
NSS, the 2015 NMS echoed the need to export security and conduct security cooperation 
to meet the national military objective of strengthening allies and partners.118 Building 
partner capacity is the multilateral approach called for in recent U.S. strategic guidance; in 
many cases, fragile states require immediate and prioritized support to its security 
apparatus in order to begin building other government institutions.  
The 2015 NSS specifically articulated the importance of security cooperation, 
which has not been rescinded by the current administration. As a global leader the United 
States not only owns the security requirement to protect its own citizens, but also to prevent 
conflict internationally by bolstering partner nations. “American diplomacy and leadership, 
backed by a strong military, remain essential to deterring future acts of inter-state 
aggression and provocation by reaffirming our security commitments to allies and 
partners.”119  
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The 2017 NSS includes four national interests: first, “protect the American people, 
the homeland, and the American way of life; second, promote American prosperity; third, 
preserve peace through strength; and fourth, advance American influence.”120 It calls for 
the U.S. to maintain its military and economic supremacy so that it may best lead 
international regimes it shaped. While this NSS reorients the strategic focus to great power 
rivals such as China and Russia, it does not abandon the importance of SFA. The 2017 NSS 
asserts the U.S. will remain engaged with partners by conducting security cooperation to 
develop their capacity and encourage them to ultimately work independently of U.S. 
assistance.121 The 2018 NDS echoes this by asserting that while China and Russia are 
principal priorities and COCOMs aligned against them require increased funding, the 
Department intends to sustain security cooperation and SFA efforts to counter Iran, combat 
terrorism, and consolidate gains in Iraq and Afghanistan.122 Additionally, a review of the 
FY2019 budget indicates not only that Central Command (CENTCOM) will maintain its 
core funding, it will also be the beneficiary of new U.S. weapons programs, readiness 
packages, and additional security cooperation priorities.123  
D. SFA AND FRAGILE STATES  
Assisting fragile states is one of the main security concerns of our time. Fragile 
states have received more attention and emphasis from the White House since 9/11. 
Internal violence and an inability of a government to provide positive political goods to its 
inhabitants are the ingredients for state failure.124 Rotberg clarifies, “failed states are tense, 
deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions…occasionally, the 
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official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies.”125 In 2006, Robert 
Gates was serving as the Secretary of the Department of Defense and asserted, “in the 
decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security…are likely 
to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own 
territory.”126 At the time, the U.S. military had recently toppled the regimes in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and was working feverishly to suppress insurgent groups while nation 
building in these two war-zones. Robert Gates called for the U.S. government to “get better 
at what is called ‘building partner capacity’: helping other countries defend 
themselves.”127  
Since 2006, the U.S. has become more concerned with destabilizing events such as 
the Arab Spring that expanded civil unrest which can lead to power vacuums in places like 
Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Syria.128 The rise of violent extremist organizations 
(VEO) and non-state actors in places like: Somalia, Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, 
Kenya, and Uganda cued the U.S. government to pay special attention to Africa by creating 
AFRICOM and USARAF in 2009 with the task to support security cooperation operations 
in Africa.129 Fragile states have received attention at the highest levels of the U.S. 
Government since 9/11, as they have proven to harbor VEOs, de-stabilize partner nations, 
and threaten U.S. strategic interests abroad.   
The problem of failed states and malignant nonstate actors is a complex 
phenomenon which has nonetheless led to a consensus undergirding state-building solution 
proposed by U.S. strategic documents which generally emphasize the need to control 
territory within defined borders. Nonstate actors, however, are simply not confined to 
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operating within a specified state or region; they can easily move across territorial 
boundaries once conditions are insufficient for their operational goals.  
There has been a post-9/11 mindset and misconception among some 
Western policymakers that these areas require greater “stateness,” a linear, 
neo-colonialist viewpoint that assumes that “strong” and “weak” comprise 
opposite ends of the development spectrum, when, in fact, these two terms 
often operate in symbiosis with each other. As such, I argue that territory is 
often a poor metric to capture military progress in the fight against violent 
nonstate actors such as ISIS and that there has perhaps been too much focus 
on failed states, ungoverned spaces, and safe havens.130 
An over-emphasis on territory control will in many cases lead to military solutions 
that overlook the flexibility of nonstate actors to re-locate and even operate virtually.131 
Paradoxically, cunning nonstate actors have the option to relocate under pressure, 
reconstitute power, and return at an opportune time; and in many cases they can reap the 
benefits of financial and communications institutions established by state-building efforts. 
Terrorist organizations and other nonstate actors require some form of stability, society, 
and infrastructure in which to operate to gain resources and achieve their goals. SFA’s 
purpose is to prevent hostile actors, whether state or non-state actors from building enough 
strength to threaten the homeland or U.S. interests; the task is to outsource U.S. security 
requirements, to varying degrees, to regional partners in the pursuit of this goal. 
E. CONCLUSION  
This chapter set out to define strategy, summarize the criteria of analyzing grand 
strategies, summarize competing visions of U.S. grand strategy and the linkages between 
strategy, and, the challenge of fragile states. SFA can be viewed best as a foreign policy 
tool that seeks to increase U.S. influence and protect its national interests abroad at low 
political, economic, and military costs. It is hence seen as an attractive policy option by 
political leaders. Elements of selective engagement can be seen in this approach as it 
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applied to only certain areas tied to U.S. national interests. Even as polar opposites, neo-
isolationism and primacy can be seen in the SFA approach as, on one hand, the policy aim 
is to prevent massive U.S. military deployments, and on the other hand, to extend U.S. 
influence in ways that preserves its dominance. The tenants of cooperative security are 
most widespread throughout the SFA concept as the ultimate goal is to bolster alliances 
and build partner militaries that are cooperative to U.S. interests.  
The National Security Strategies since 9/11 have placed a great emphasis on 
stabilizing fragile regions and ungoverned spaces due to the consensus that malignant 
nonstate actors can leverage such spaces to build combat power and project it at U.S. 
national interests – and in the worst case, across the oceans to the mainland. Yet, the fragile 
state problem is one that is more nuanced than current approaches have indicated. The 
policy of security cooperation and building foreign militaries is one military-led solution 
that is directly tied to securing ungoverned spaces and the territory and population within 
fragile states. The subsequent chapter will review these assumptions and constraints in 
greater detail in an effort to critically analyze current SFA policy.  
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III. SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE POLICY AND PLANS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
SFA is a foreign policy tool utilized by many nations to build foreign militaries – 
it is not a new concept. It falls under the umbrella of security cooperation and ultimately, 
security sector assistance. SFA has been used as a means to project power and influence 
abroad, secure U.S access, secure vital U.S. interests, act as a bulwark to adversaries, and 
protect the homeland from attacks. SFA is designed to enable partner nations (PN) to secure 
their own backyards in order to limit the need/likelihood of a massive U.S. military 
(combat) deployment; at best, results have been mixed. Abundant research has been 
conducted by the U.S. government, think tanks, and academics to determine why in many 
cases, SFA misses the mark and does not produce lasting security in fragile regions. The 
results of these studies often lead policymakers and planners to request more equipment, 
more training, and more money.132 While the U.S. continues to throw money at the 
problem, policymakers fail to scrutinize the root and underlying causes for faltering SFA 
efforts. The purpose of this chapter is to review the critical assumptions and constraints 
that are often overlooked during SFA planning and to critically analyze the policy that 
authorizes it.  
For the sake of clarity, policymakers are defined as those who direct U.S. foreign 
policy and strategy from the executive and legislative branches of government. SFA 
planners are the officers who operationalize U.S. foreign policy, specifically, from the 
security cooperation offices. Assumptions and constraints are both terms found in joint 
doctrine. For the purposes of this thesis, an assumption is defined as a belief or supposition 
that is widely accepted by policymakers and SFA planners. A constraint is defined as an 
inherent limitation or impediment in which policymakers and SFA planners must consider 
and take necessary action to mitigate.  
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In order to determine a correlation between incomplete SFA policy/planning and 
undesired SFA outcomes, this chapter will take a holistic approach to the problem. In the 
first section, this chapter will enumerate the primary assumptions made by U.S. 
policymakers and SFA planners that undermine mission performance. The second section 
will seek to identify constraints in SFA missions that in many ways cancel out any progress 
made. The third section will discuss the implications of these assumptions and overlooked 
constraints that guarantee the U.S. remains involved abroad. Finally, the fourth section will 
critically examine current policies that authorize SFA. Key areas this chapter will cover 
are: principal-agent interest misalignment, over-reliance on technical/hardware support, 
limited acknowledgment of partner nation needs, incomplete measures of effectiveness, 
external actor interference, weak partner nation institutions, and loose ends in SFA policy.  
While the U.S. military can effectively train foreign militaries and in many cases 
achieve tactical success, it is likely that policymakers and leaders at the strategic level need 
to properly assess progress and gauge intent/interest alignment with partner governments 
to ensure these efforts have long term benefits. The following sections of the chapter will 
address the most critical assumptions and constraints which can easily be overlooked by 
U.S. policymakers and SFA planners that lead to undesired outcomes.  
B. ASSUMPTIONS MADE DURING SFA PLANNING 
The growing realm of SFA studies generally identifies various and multiple 
weaknesses in the methods in which the U.S. approaches the SFA mission. These problems 
range from PN unwillingness, PN incapability, and PN civil-militaries divergences, to 
name a few, all of which focus centrally on the recipient nation’s shortcomings. While 
these arguments may have validity, we must look in the mirror; what we will find is a 
collection of assumptions that fail to tailor proper approaches, which in the end may lead 
to PN shortcomings. Assumptions permeate throughout SFA literature. This section will 
focus on assumptions such as: hardware is the answer, measures of performance determine 
effectiveness, the western approach can fit anywhere, and external actors will not have a 
vote in the outcome.  
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U.S. policymakers and SFA planners continue to throw hardware and technical 
support at the problem, assuming a quick fix. Multiple SFA missions have shown how this 
narrow approach will fail as it does not account for a broader political reform strategy; one 
such example is the flop of the Malian army in 2012.133 The inherent political nature of 
changing a PN’s institutions have routinely been boiled down as a military-technical 
problem and therefore often places the U.S. military in the lead for reforms.134 This 
assumption is not only flawed, it is categorically self-defeating. After all, the state of 
civilian-military relations in the U.S. is fundamentally structured to ensure the military is 
devoid of political involvement;135 to request the U.S. military lead the effort in SFA is 
ambitious at best. This bottom-up, technical approach frequently leads to a circular security 
problem in regions the U.S. attempts to stabilize and all but ensures policymakers are 
removed from involvement with political reforms that should occur in conjunction with 
tactical military assistance.136 As the gap between military (hardware and technical) 
assistance and political institution reforms (of the PN) continues to widen, more time and 
money will be misused. Historical evaluation of SFA missions suggests that when the U.S. 
becomes deeply involved in PN political reform by influencing personnel and organization 
from the top, while refraining from a co-combatant role, the outcomes will produce desired 
results of a self-sufficient PN military apparatus.137   
Measures of performance have too often been assumed to be the best gauge for 
mission success. The raw numbers of PN soldiers trained, missions performed, collective 
training events accrued, number of weapons and “capabilities” transferred – or worse, the 
number of joint U.S. enablers deployed to support SFA – are closely tracked to confirm 
“effectiveness.” Such measures of performance led the U.S. to believe the Iraqi army was 
set for a sustained monopoly of violence in 2011 when the SFA mission ended. As this 
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thesis is being written, the same measures are once again being tallied as U.S. military 
advisors have returned to Iraq but are also serving in co-combatant roles. The “success” 
and “effectiveness” of the Iraqi army re-seizing Mosul in 2017 must be reconsidered as the 
efforts were largely accomplished with the overwhelming support of U.S. advisors, 
intelligence platforms, and joint-fires.138 Perhaps the current set of measures of 
performance need to be supplanted for proper measures of effectiveness. It should be noted, 
however, the ability to gauge progress of SFA missions is undermined by weak policy 
direction, ambiguous expectations, and unhinged priorities.139 This problem can be viewed 
as two-fold: first, the DoD has limited capability to identify correct approaches to PN 
problems; second, SFA is void of a diagnostic to ensure that correct root-cause problems 
are identified for rectification.140 Underpinning both circumstances is the assumption that 
the DoD is the best proponent to lead these efforts. The lack of proper measures of 
effectiveness often leads U.S. COCOMs to report tactical successes or other miniscule 
good news stories as grandiose achievements while tactical failures are not seen as what 
they are—policy failures.141 While ad hoc programs to assist fragile states are undertaken, 
it is striking to see that deliberate and mature programs such as NATO have no metrics to 
assess progress in defense reform.142  
The U.S. approach to SFA that routinely involves the assumption that western 
methodology will fit anywhere is similar to fitting a square peg in a round hole. This 
assumption ignores PN culture, chain of command nuances, and other internal dynamics. 
The U.S. SFA mission in Afghanistan is an example of one that produced a military that is 
not capable of sustaining or financing the technical capabilities delivered to it by the U.S.; 
this ensures the U.S. is fastened to an Afghan military that is thoroughly dependent on 
                                                 
138 Jahara Matisek, “The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fabergé Egg 
Armies” Defense and Security Analysis (August 2018): 13, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14751798.2018.1500757.  
139 Young, Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions, 188.  
140 Young, 189.  
141 Young, 188–189.  
142 Young 188.  
35 
consistent inputs, material support, and security assistance.143 SFA missions in 
Afghanistan highlight how the cultural and national wealth divide between the sponsor and 
recipient nation produces undesired outcomes. In fact, great disparity between sponsor 
nation and recipient nation culture and national wealth can impede SFA success; steps need 
to be taken to mitigate the differences.144  
SFA planners at times downplay or overlook key cultural norms that can serve as 
friction points during SFA execution. Western (typical sponsor nations) militaries advocate 
decentralized execution, embrace uncertainty, are driven by results oriented leadership, and 
accept failure as a part of learning, central/eastern European nations (typical recipient 
nations) have cultural norms that are diametrically opposed to those concepts.145  SFA 
missions suffer setbacks as planners disregard these cultural variances – sometimes the 
western approach simply does not translate. SFA planners pursue objectives that are 
assumed to be specific and measurable. However, the reality is that execution is scrambled 
within PN internal dynamics such as: accountability mechanisms, decision/funding 
processes, election cycles, and fluctuating interests.146 As assumptions made in SFA 
planning become apparent in execution, sponsor nations’ typically wear out their welcome 
over time and lose their already limited ability to motivate change in PN sensitive internal 
dynamics.147 
The assumption that the primary stakeholders in sustained security for a PN are the 
U.S. and the PN discounts antagonistic external actors. These antagonistic external actors 
operate as spoilers and can vary; they can be rival insurgent networks, terrorist 
organizations, or adversarial nations that in many ways counter the goals of SFA missions. 
“Spoilers” may increase efforts to undermine PN security by countering SFA missions in 
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ways that cue the U.S. to become a co-combatant and/or cause violence to escalate once 
the SFA program ends.148  One example of a spoiler is the role Iran plays in countering 
U.S. efforts to build the Iraqi military. Since 2003, Iran has funded and directed the 
activities of client and proxy networks in Iraq that have undermined SFA missions; 
furthermore, Iran has leveraged the efforts of U.S. SFA to their benefit. In October 2017, 
the Iraqi army (trained and equipped by the U.S.) launched an offensive in Kirkuk with the 
purpose of expelling Iraqi Kurds (also a U.S. ally), under the guidance of Iranian operatives 
who enjoyed employing American-made M1A2 Abrams tanks and Humvees in the 
operation.149 The assumption that SFA missions will only benefit the PN and U.S. interests 
and that adversarial stakeholders will remain indifferent or not find ways to benefit is 
mistaken.  
C. CONSTRAINTS OVERLOOKED DURING SFA PLANNING 
Along with assumptions, policymakers and planners generally fail to manage the 
constraints inherent to SFA. This section will appraise some of the constraints that are 
likely to undermine the broader goal of SFA. In similar fashion to western assumptions, 
overlooked constraints saturate SFA literature and critiques, yet, they will likely remain 
discounted during planning as marginal problems. Steep principal-agent (P-A) 
misalignment, lack of effective institutional capacity of the PN, and little or no regard for 
PN priorities are some of the many constraints inherent to SFA on which policymakers and 
planners should place more consideration.  
As stated in the previous section, effective SFA is more difficult to achieve than 
planners lead policymakers to believe. SFA is utilized in regions of interest to the U.S. as 
an alternate method to large and expensive troop deployments for which the American 
people have little to no appetite. This method is possible, “[O]nly if U.S. policy is intrusive 
and conditional, which it rarely is.”150  This condition sets the foundation for the P-A 
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misalignment. Large interest misalignments frequently exist between the principal 
(provider) and the agent (recipient), which produce difficulties in monitoring challenges 
and conditions for implementation.151 This combination leaves the principal with limited 
control and creates inefficiencies in aid provision.152  Paradoxically, in order to rectify the 
P-A misalignment, principals must expend additional resources to monitor the agent’s 
work (serving principal’s interests), thus, undermining the spirit of low-cost SFA.153  As 
principals become more intrusive, the agent must be reassured; this often leads to a “moral 
hazard” in which the agent becomes emboldened to take advantage of the principal, 
undoubtedly leading to “agency loss,” or, undesired outcomes.154  Additionally, the greater 
the cultural disparity in P-A relationships and the longer the P-A relationship is maintained, 
the less likely the client will achieve sustained success.155 
Examples of P-A misalignment and moral hazards are not difficult to find. In Syria, 
one U.S. trained division commander complained about not receiving enough weapons 
from the U.S. after admitting that he gave half of his weapons to the hostile Jabhat al-
Nusrah group.156  In Egypt, the U.S. provides extensive economic and military assistance 
to a government that represses its people, which exacerbates grievances and can lead to 
more Islamic radicalization. The U.S. has trained and equipped Saudi forces that continue 
a heavy-handed war with Yemini Houthis that many characterize as an ongoing human 
rights violation.157 Clearly, P-A interest misalignment is a constraint to successful SFA 
that is either ignored or misunderstood and undermines the broader SFA effort.  
Institutional capacity of a partner nation is often cited as a key facet of effective 
SFA, yet, the constraint is habitually disregarded or misunderstood during planning. 
                                                 
151 Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” 127.  
152 Biddle, 127. 
153 Biddle, 127.  
154 Biddle, 127.  
155 Zachary Hoover, “Building Partner Capacity: The Science Behind the Art” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2016), 65, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/51719.  
156 Justin Reynolds, “Training Wreck.” The American Interest 12, no.4 (February 2017), 
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/07/training-wreck/.  
157 Saab, “What Does America Get for its Military Aid?” 
38 
Ineffective formal institutions in partner nations are often the root cause for instability, 
however, the U.S. is not good at building this type of capacity and seeks to avoid it—as to 
avoid the perception of nation building (a dirty word in foreign policy).158 SFA missions 
are therefore increasingly militarized and focus solely on hardware and technical 
assistance. Even if the PN successfully increases its military capacity and finds tactical 
success, internal conflicts may not be resolved, which will push the violence to the 
periphery of the nation and likely spill over into neighboring countries and/or cause refugee 
crises.159 By consistently ignoring the PN’s institutional capacity during planning, SFA 
efforts only treat one symptom of regional instability and often lead to powerful side-
affects that cancel out progress made.  
SFA planners can easily hinder execution by ignoring the PN’s input; disregard for 
the PN’s true requirements feeds the P-A problem. When this constraint is ignored, the 
U.S. may become the sole beneficiary of a partnership relationship. “FMF [foreign military 
financing] advances U.S. interests in many ways…countries buy U.S. equipment…the 
basis of the relationship is formed. The countries typically secure long-term commitments 
for training in how to maintain and operate the equipment…relationships are sustained 
through military sales…spare and replacement parts ensure that competitor countries do 
not interfere.”160 Despite the U.S. building up East African countries’ coast guards to 
defeat piracy (U.S. interest), these PNs consider illegal and unreported fishing as a greater 
concern.161 By ignoring the most basic constraint of SFA – the PN’s realistic requirements 
and needs – the U.S. effort is inhibited from the onset of execution and sets the tone for an 
undesired outcome.  
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D. IMPLICATIONS OF ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
The effects of weak SFA policy and planning not only inhibit the ability of the PN 
to sustain a monopoly of violence, they also reduce the overall readiness of the U.S. Army. 
As shown in previous sections, the long-term success of SFA missions are undercut by 
focusing too much on technical “capabilities” and largely ignore the underlying causes, 
nuances, and atmospherics that cue the SFA mission in the first place. This section will 
highlight how unsuitable approaches to SFA can fan the flames of violence and actually 
serve as a de-stabilizer to the PN.  
Africa has historically been a strategic afterthought of the U.S.; prior to the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT), U.S. intervention on the continent was limited primarily to 
humanitarian emergencies. AFRICOM and USARAF were established in 2009 with the 
task to support security cooperation operations and SFA throughout the continent.162 As 
the GWOT has persisted, U.S. military involvement has increased to include a permanent 
U.S. base in Djibouti, multiple security cooperative locations, and will soon include a 
substantial U.S. base in Niger tasked to support increasing drone operations.163  
SFA policy towards Mali has been misplaced as it ignores the guerillas’ success 
and growth that largely emerged from Mali’s political order that remains favorable only to 
national elites.164 As the political problem is ignored, a narrow focus on technical  support 
to the Malian army persists and is assumed to be the best fix.165 When the Malian army 
collapsed in 2012, critical atmospherics (constraints) such as state legitimacy, national 
identity, and resource distribution were ignored – as were vast human rights abuses 
conducted by the army.166 Chad offers a similar example as it has hosted numerous joint-
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military exercises (organized by the U.S.), shares intelligence, and is a U.S. partner in 
battling Boko Haram—yet their political leadership has also directed human rights abuses 
and leverages U.S. assistance to consolidate rule.167 Simply put, more capable militaries 
trained by SFA with the assumed best method of technical assistance may only become 
better oppressors if the political problem is unheeded by policymakers. 
The U.S. Army’s mission is to fight and win the nation’s land wars. The go-to 
element utilized for this task is the BCT. In recent years, virtually all deployments that 
BCTs have taken part in have been focused, not in fundamental Army tasks, but those of 
asymmetric operations and SFA. Requirements on the BCTs continue to mount while the 
number of BCTs continue to shrink. BCTs have been continuously utilized to serve in SFA 
roles; this mission set is a far cry from the training cycle that is utilized at the home station. 
During home station and pre-mission training, tanks maneuver to close with and destroy 
plywood tank targets, infantry elements seize key terrain, artillery elements deliver 
accurate indirect fire, sustainers feverishly deliver classes of supply to all BCT elements, 
and the Brigade headquarters integrates the functions and joint assets. When deployed, the 
BCT replaces a BCT that arrived nine-months prior and now faces the task of building 
relations with the PN to counter VEOs or provide theater security cooperation efforts. 
These deployment tasks do not marry up with the training tasks – leading to a situation of 
perishing fundamental skills and readiness while BCTs arriving to areas of operation 
inadequately prepared to fulfill the mission requirements. The following chapter will delve 
into BCT readiness issues that resulted from an over-reliance on BCT’s to perform SFA 
missions. 
E. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SFA POLICY 
With the assumptions and constraints inherent to SFA outlined and their 
implications discussed from the lens of academia and think tanks, current policies and 
procedures can be analyzed. This section will examine the course corrections taken by 
policymakers in an effort to reduce ad hoc approaches, increase accountability, and 
                                                 
167 Powell, “The Destabilizing Dangers of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Sahel.”   
41 
enhance interagency collaboration; ultimately, the research suggests that loop holes are still 
in place.  
The DoD’s role in building foreign militaries has grown significantly since 9/11. 
The DoD had a direct role in planning and budgeting these projects and even created the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) to implement these plans.168 With the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan shifting to stability and security cooperation, many of the 
traditional sets of U.S. foreign assistance programs began to fall under the purview of the 
DoD, calling into question the over-militarization of U.S. foreign policy.169 To rectify the 
imbalance, President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive-23 (PPD-23) in April 
2013 in order to formally direct the agencies (DoS, DoD, DoT, USAID, etc.) to work 
together to accomplish security sector assistance (SSA).170 Recognizing that floundering 
SSA initiatives may very well have been the product of disjointed U.S. efforts, President 
Obama mandated collaboration.  
Transparency and coordination across the United States Government are 
needed to integrate security sector assistance into broader strategies, 
synchronize agencies efforts, reduce redundancies, minimize assistance-
delivery timelines…measure effectiveness…all agencies will take practical 
steps to embrace the principle of joint formulation and share 
responsibilities.171 
The PPD formally identified the DoS as the leading agency for all SSA activities.172 
Furthermore, it required the formulation of a country team to plan efforts at the country 
level with participation of relevant agencies and subject matter experts to craft an integrated 
country strategy (ICS) to be approved by the chief of mission.173 The ICS is to be the core 
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organizing document for SSA activities in a specific country and will be subjugated to 
monitoring assessments and an inter-agency (DoD / DoS) SSA oversight board.174 It is 
clear in PPD-23 the President was mandating that U.S. foreign policy de-militarize itself 
by directing the DoS to take the lead and integrate the tools of U.S. national power.   
Unfortunately, it took nearly four years of stagnant SFA in Afghanistan, terrorism 
spill over and proliferation in Africa, and the complete failure of the Iraqi Security Forces 
at the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to motivate any real change in 
planning. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2017 contained language 
that was critical of the ad hoc nature of security cooperation, an over-emphasis on tactical 
and operational training at the expense of institution building, deficiencies in DoD and DoS 
interaction, and the persistent lack of performance measures to assess progress.175 
In light of this direction, the DoD issued DoD-Instruction (DoD-I) 5132.14, 
Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation 
Enterprise.176 The primary purpose of this DoD-I is to foster accountability, assess 
sustainability of programs, and improve returns on DoD security cooperation 
investments.177 Additionally, it mandated the conduct of initial assessments designed to 
establish a baseline, address assumptions and constraints, and ultimately guide the process. 
To this point, the MILDEPs and agencies involved in security cooperation lacked a unified 
platform to share data relevant to assessing, monitoring, and the evaluation (AM&E) of PN 
capability and capacity. This directive rectified that problem with the implementation of 
the Global Theatre Security Cooperation Information Management System (G-
TSCMIS).178 Entry of security cooperation AM&E data into G-TSCMIS is required during 
all phases of planning and execution; this initiative is designed to reduce redundancy, share 
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lessons learned, and track the progress of partner nations with relevant performance 
metrics.  
The 2017 NDAA also sets forth a broader range of authorities for the DoD in 
section 333, Foreign Security Forces: authority to build capacity.179 This section allows 
the DoD to conduct programs that build capacity of partner nations in the realms of counter-
terrorism, counter-weapons of mass destruction, counter-illicit drug trafficking, and 
maritime and border security. This section is the primary source for what the DoD refers 
to as SFA; therefore, building partner capacity and SFA are used synonymously.  
Up unto this point, one would believe that the DoS is truly the lead for SFA 
activities as it falls under SC and SSA; however, there is always a loop hole. The pseudo 
letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) is that loop hole. In a traditional LOA, requests from 
partner nations are typically the catalyst for the SSA (SA or SC) process to begin; by 
initiating a letter of request (LOR), the partner nation will justify the purpose of the defense 
article or training, how they intend to utilize it, and how they intend to sustain the capability 
long term.180 Once the LOR is received by a U.S. security cooperation officer, it is highly 
scrutinized with checklists, legal reviews, foreign disclosure, and will likely be adjusted 
and returned to the partner nation in the form of an LOA. This process is followed for 
foreign military sales, institutional training, and other services; however, SFA and BPC 
programs largely utilize the pseudo LOA.  
With a pseudo LOA, the DoD (typically a COCOM) will initiate the request to 
deliver defense articles, services, or training that support Section 333 of Title 10 U.S. Code 
as listed above.181 The pseudo LOA is not signed by the recipient partner nation, the U.S. 
is responsible for shipment of the defense articles, and the rigorous terms of the traditional 
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LOA do not apply to pseudo LOAs.182 Pseudo LOAs came about because the DoD 
essentially took the lead on security assistance after 9/11; despite PPD-23 and NDAA 17 
attempting to de-militarize foreign policy, the pseudo LOA remains. Despite the 
requirement to notify Congress of pseudo-LOAs, the process to deliver SFA is streamlined 
in ways that ultimately keep the DoD as the lead agency for security sector assistance.   
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has set out to identify correlation between incoherent SFA planning 
that does not properly recognize assumptions and minimizes the constraints inherent to 
SFA missions. A holistic approach was utilized to describe the nature and context of the 
SFA mission, its purposes, and desired outcomes. While the failures and shortcomings of 
many PN forces is largely blamed on the PN itself or the U.S. Generals in charge of 
overseeing these SFA operations, this chapter argues a share of the fault rests on SFA 
policy and planning. A critical analysis of security assistance policy was completed and 
indicates that despite Executive and Congressional efforts to de-militarize U.S. foreign 
policy, loops holes remain. As SFA policy remains incoherent, SFA planners overlook the 
assumptions that militarized and technical approaches are best – automatically presuming 
measures of effectiveness to be the raw-data of how many “capabilities” are transferred 
and how many soldiers get trained. The assumption that the only stakeholders involved are 
the U.S. and the PN fails to account for external actors and the culture of the broader PN, 
which may undermine success. Constraints intrinsic to SFA are easy to overlook as the P-
A problem manifests itself in many ways, to include: misaligned and fluctuating interest of 
both parties, ignored PN support requests, and inappropriate focuses that misunderstand 
the institutional capacity of a PN.  
Implications of poor SFA policy and plans can have unintended destabilizing 
effects in fragile regions and serve to reduce the overall readiness of the primary MILDEP 
utilized for the mission – the U.S. Army. While the U.S. continues to throw money at the 
problem, policymakers fail to scrutinize the root and underlying causes for faltering SFA 
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efforts. The U.S. military will continue to execute SFA missions handed down from 
policymakers. The U.S. military can and will continue to effectively train foreign 
militaries, especially with the top-cover of the pseudo LOA. Policymakers and SFA 
planners need to properly address these planning assumptions and constraints in order to 
assess progress and ensure intent/interest alignment with foreign governments if the desired 
outcome it to ensure these efforts have long term benefits. Until that occurs, SFA will 
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IV. THE U.S. ARMY’S ROLE IN SECURITY FORCE 
ASSISTANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate how the U.S. Army adapted its doctrine 
and organization to meet rising SFA requirements and to determine why the U.S. Army is 
establishing six Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB). It will assert the SFABs are 
being established to meet enduring SFA requirements and allow the Army’s general-
purpose forces (GPF) to focus on increasing readiness, training, and preparing for future 
high-intensity conflicts. As the research will describe, tactical adaptions to problem-sets in 
Iraq and Afghanistan heavily influenced innovations in doctrine and SFA organizations 
while increasing operational requirements necessitated the Army to overcome resistance 
to SFA.  
While the DoS exports diplomacy and leadership to nations with weak governance, 
the DoD plays a critical role in exporting security by building capability and capacity in 
nations that are combating terrorism and violent non-state actors. Critical to this effort is 
to “address the root causes of conflict before they erupt.”183 Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, 
Security Cooperation, defines capability as the partner’s ability to accomplish an assigned 
task; whereas, capacity is defined as the partner’s “ability to self-sustain and self-replicate 
a given capability.”184 As SFA requirements continued to rise, the U.S. Army’s primary 
deployable force, the BCTs, were increasingly called upon to fill requirements which led 
to low levels of readiness across the Army. While the U.S. Army continued to find itself 
operating at a high tempo with SFA missions, a new emphasis was placed on ensuring 
BCTs across the U.S. Army could defeat a near peer threat in high-intensity conflict.  
SFA has undergone many transformations that ultimately led to the SFAB; a 
chronological approach will be used to observe the trends that led to the current model of 
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the SFAB and the doctrine it utilizes. The evolution of SFA will be discussed by reviewing 
lessons learned, complications, and successes from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Competing operational requirements of the BCTs and the U.S. Army SOF will be reviewed 
as they pertain to SFA.   
B. INNOVATION AND ADAPTION – THE U.S. ARMY’S SFA GROWING 
PAINS 
This section will introduce the theories of military innovation and adaption that 
ultimately lead to a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Bureaucratic politics, 
organizational behavior, organizational culture, and organizational learning also serve as 
variables, and paradoxically, as inhibitors that lead to RMA. These theories and ideas will 
be introduced to establish a platform for the subsequent discussions on U.S. Army doctrine 
and organizations leading up to the conceptualization and implementation of the SFAB. 
The institutionalization of the SFA mission in the U.S. Army’s form of the SFAB can be 
seen as an RMA that is the manifestation of subsequent innovations and war-time 
adaptions.  
The highest level of military change is the RMA; it refers to “radical military 
innovation, in which organizational structures together with novel force deployment 
methods…change the conduct of warfare.”185 This kind of change is tectonic, as it blends 
organizational change, doctrinal change, the way of war, and the manner in which planners’ 
vision future conflicts.186 The wide consensus in academia is that military innovation is a 
top-down driven process in which organizational leaders are the primary variable in major 
changes.187 Stephen Peter Rosen defines a major innovation as “a change that forces one 
of the primary combat arms of a service to change its concepts of operation and its relation 
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to other combat arms.”188 He goes on to argue that military innovation is essentially a 
problem of bureaucracy and that because bureaucracies are designed to not change, 
militaries can be resistant to transformation.189 Barry Posen also claims a top-down view 
of innovation. Those at the top of an organizational hierarchy have achieved rank and 
position by mastering old doctrine and, therefore, will only seek innovation if civilian 
authorities force the change or if the old doctrine leads to a decisive military defeat.190  
While innovation is regarded as a higher-level concept involving organizational and 
doctrinal change, adaption is more tactical in nature and not as widely studied. James 
Russell worked to fill this gap by examining how tactical adaptions can potentially lead to 
military innovations. He found that feedback loops act as channels to codify effective 
adaptions and can lead to a change in organizational procedures; over time this process can 
lead to departures in organizational operations.191 In fact, tactical adaptions in wartime are 
vital to the process of the kind of organizational learning that can lead to an internally 
driven military innovation or RMA.192 Despite different causal theories, the common 
denominators of military innovation include a change in operations, doctrine, and the 
“eventual development of different missions for military units not previously 
envisioned.”193 Arguably, the formation of the SFAB is one such military innovation as it 
brings a new Army unit complete with an innovative organization, mission, doctrine, and 
new incentives.   
The U.S. Army’s decision to commit energy, capital, and manpower to a mission 
that is not consistent with its organizational essence and culture has not happened 
overnight. Like any organization, the U.S. Army has a doctrinal mission to accomplish and 
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will seek to sustain its core competencies, which are deeply rooted in its cultural identity. 
“Organizational essence is the view held by a dominant group within the organization of 
what its mission and capabilities should be.”194 An organization’s essence will shape how 
it prioritizes interests; furthermore, it will pursue capabilities, policies, and strategies that 
support its essence and resist those that threaten that essence.195 The leaders within the 
U.S. Army view their essence to be ground combat capability and have historically been 
less interested in missions that fall outside that realm, such as the Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG) during the Korean War and Vietnam War.196 Today, the U.S. 
Army’s mission is to “fight and win our Nation’s wars by providing prompt, sustained land 
dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support 
of combatant commanders.”197 This broad mission statement not only deliberately delivers 
land dominance as a key task but also acknowledges military operations, such as SFA, that 
occur on all sides of the conflict continuum. Subsequent sections of this chapter will 
provide an evidence chain to examine how the effects of tactical adaptions, civilian 
(policymaker) interventions, operational requirements, and pioneering military leaders lead 
the ad hoc efforts to improve SFA in ways that culminated in the SFAB.  
C. INNOVATION AND ADAPTION OF SFA DOCTRINE   
The tempo of operations between 2004 and 2006 quickly outpaced doctrine 
development. U.S. servicemembers were deploying to highly complex operating 
environments with growing terrorist networks and insurgencies with no doctrine to 
effectively prepare for the mission. Despite the lack of a unifying joint doctrine, Soldiers 
and Marines effectively adapted their techniques and procedures to counter the enemy.198 
With feedback loops established, tactical adaptions manifested into organizational 
innovations as standard operating procedures were developed and a greater institutional 
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knowledgebase was formed.199 As U.S. servicemembers performed as best they could with 
no doctrinal framework for operations, policymakers continued to fumble the doctrine 
problem.  
The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from 
Hostilities report emphasised that the DoD and the DoS needed to make stabilization and 
reconstruction missions one of their core competencies.200 Bureaucratic politics led 
policymakers to disregard this recommendation for increased interagency collaboration; 
however, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and DoD Instruction Number 
3000.05 empowered General David Petraeus to craft counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine 
for stability operations.201 By 2006, FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, was delivered as it 
asserted, “This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap… our Soldiers and Marines [are] 
fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is essential that we give them a manual… 
Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors…They must be 
prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces.”202 This militarized 
approach to SFA would persist until 2009.   
Shifts in irregular warfare approaches under the Obama Administration began as 
early as January 2009 with the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report that aimed 
to bridge the interagency divide.203 This report stated, “the Department [of Defense] will 
continue to promote and participate in efforts to institutionalize irregular warfare in 
interagency planning… primary irregular warfare activities addressed by this report – 
foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, 
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and stability operations.”204 Subsequently, an updated DoD Instruction 3000.05 mandated 
the DoD performs stability operations through all phases of conflict and take a “whole of 
government” approach that achieves interagency collaboration.205 Despite the DoD-
Instruction, senior military leaders insisted that “stability operations were just a subset of 
conventional ones and that skill in the later had deteriorated…emphasis would shift to 
almost strictly conventional training.”206  
Regardless of bureaucratic politics and organizational tensions, by 2009, the U.S. 
Army quickly turned one of the first doctrinal manuals focused solely on SFA, FM 3–07.1, 
Security Force Assistance, arguably due to the fact that the Army was heavily invested in 
Iraq and Afghanistan with the SFA aperture expanding to Africa. “Based on lesson learned 
from previous advising efforts…two primary audiences for this manual are leaders in BCTs 
conducting SFA and Soldiers assigned as advisors.”207 The U.S. Army defined SFA as 
“the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security 
forces in support of a legitimate authority.”208 Army units deploying in support of SFA 
were now armed with doctrine that provided strategic context, SFA activities, metrics for 
assessments, training objectives, and organizations.   
While the U.S. Army worked feverishly to codify SFA doctrine, hesitancy at the 
joint level persisted until 2016. JP 3–22, Foreign Internal Defense, (FID) was established 
in 2010 to clarify how joint operations would involve all instruments of power to support 
partner nation efforts to build capacity.209 JP 3–22 missed the mark, as FID is an effort to 
support already established internal defense, while SFA is an effort to develop the security 
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forces so it can make strides in governance. Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 was published in 
2013, yet again, it formally directed the DoD to collaborate with other U.S. agencies to 
“strengthen the capability and capacity of a partner nations security forces.”210 JP 3–07, 
Stability, was published in 2016, and it emphasized a comprehensive approach; “unlike a 
whole-of-government approach that aims for true interagency integration toward unity of 
effort, a comprehensive approach requires a more nuanced, cooperative effort.”211 With 
the codification of JP 3–07, the military departments now had a unifying framework within 
which to ground operations. With the SFA mission enduring as the U.S. Army announced 
the SFAB concept, JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, was released in 2017 that further 
clarified roles, responsibilities, planning efforts, and assessment metrics for future SFA 
missions.212  
Coupled with JP 3-20, the SFABs will utilize the most current U.S. Army doctrine 
for future missions. FM 3–07, Stability, replaced FM 3–07.1 as the most comprehensive 
manual on stability operations because it incorporates SFA as a necessary component to a 
broader stability mission. Additionally, FM 3–07 indicates that the U.S. Army can indeed 
support FID; “Army support to foreign internal defense often takes the form of security 
force assistance.”213 FM 3–07 refers heavily to FM 3–22, Army Support to Security 
Cooperation, for greater clarity on current SFA activities. FM 3–22 seeks to reduce 
confusion; “[SFA] is a subset of DoD overall security cooperation initiatives and that 
[SFA] activities directly increase the capacity or capability of FSF or their supporting 
institutions.”214 All aspects of SFA are outlined for planners to consider in order to deliver 
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a comprehensive guideline: mitigating risks, legal considerations (both domestic and 
partner-nation), assessment considerations, SFA elements, deployment activities, and 
advisor skills. SFAB planners will be enabled with comprehensive doctrine to support their 
mission; even if sifting through these nuanced manuals may be challenging, it certainly is 
better than the situation in 2004 to 2006. In June 2018, three months after the first SFAB 
deployed to Afghanistan for its initial mission, Army Training Publication (ATP) 3–96.1, 
Security Force Assistance Brigade, was published to serve as formal doctrine specific to 
the SFABs.215 
D. INNOVATION AND ADAPTION OF SFA ORGANIZATIONS   
Exporting security has taken many forms since the regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan 
were toppled with the aim to replace them with democratic regimes. Some of these forms 
will further be discussed and include: military transition teams (MiTT), advise and 
assistance brigades (AAB), security force advisory transition teams (SFATT), and 
regionally aligned forces (RAF). These approaches varied greatly in the size of military 
commitment and methods to achieve success; however, they had the same purpose to 
support security cooperation and build partnerships. Contemporarily, the SFA concept was 
utilized in Iraq by establishing the MiTT in 2004.216 A MiTT was comprised of an 11-man 
team with a wide array of specialties: infantry, intelligence, logistics, communications, and 
engineer experience that were assigned to an Iraqi battalion, brigade, or division. The ad 
hoc nature of these teams coming together coupled with no formal training or doctrine led 
to the MiTTs finding themselves overwhelmed, unsupported by local BCTs, and 
unprepared for the task.217 Initial shortcomings of the MiTT concept cued the advisor 
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surge of 2007–2008 that saw a boost in MiTT numbers and the addition of a 60-day training 
program at Fort Riley, Kansas.218  
U.S. Army officers began to advocate for the formation of a permanent U.S. Army 
unit that would serve only to conduct SFA in 2008.219 Trends and weaknesses in the 
original MiTT concept were identified through feedback loops such as: a lack of formal 
training, size constraints, loss of SFA continuity, and conflicting missions between MiTTs 
and the land-owning units to which they were assigned.220 Stephen Biddle clarified this 
point, “a standard MiTT embedded with an Iraqi battalion had only 11 Americans… some 
ISF soldiers would only see their U.S. partners once or twice a week… infrequent contact 
made it hard to monitor the performance of Iraqi units well enough to ensure consistent 
professional behavior.”221 Institutionally, the U.S. Army has been at risk for hemorrhaging 
its knowledge base over time with the lack of a permanent SFA unit to foster lessons 
learned and cultivate an SFA culture. The formation of a permanent SFA unit would 
eliminate this risk of perishing SFA skills and would increase SFA coverage to partner-
security forces abroad.222  
SFA organizations would evolve over time as the mission changed; by 2009, the 
primary U.S. focus in Iraq and Afghanistan was transition of power back to the partner 
nation. The key shift was that land-owning, combat BCTs would now be augmented for 
SFA and would reflag to AABs. Upon receipt of an SFA mission, the BCT would receive 
up to 48 trained MiTT advisors, reflag to an AAB, and thus, transform into an advisory 
brigade.223 As 2010 wound down, the mission in Iraq formally shifted from combat to 
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advise and assist.224 With the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, focus shifted to 
the war in Afghanistan; the AAB structure manifested itself in a very similar construct – 
the SFATT. Unlike the AAB, which ensured unity of effort by augmenting brigades with 
trained MiTT advisors, the SFATTs were comprised by plucking senior leaders from 
brigades and inserting them as advisors in Afghan battalions, brigades, and divisions.225  
Despite traditional combat operations and advisory missions decreasing in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the requirement for global security remained a priority as multiple fragile 
states in Africa became breeding grounds for terrorist organization and non-state actors 
alike. By 2012, the U.S. Army had great institutional knowledge from years of SFA 
experience and announced a new concept—regionally aligned forces (RAF). The main 
operational construct was to align one BCT to each combatant command (COCOM) and 
provide a trained and ready BCT to COCOM Commanders. The RAF concept affords a 
flexible BCT to meet requirements in shaping operations that could prevent conflict and 
stabilize a region; furthermore, this concept maintains years of SFA knowledge and 
produces culturally aware Soldiers.226 The RAF concept was utilized to deploy BCTs to 
Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and ultimately, a return to Iraq. Soldiers who deployed to 
Djibouti routinely trained partner forces in Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and Kenya.227 
Deployments to Kuwait often rendered the opportunity to train with soldiers from Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, and Jordan.228 The U.S. Army, specifically, its BCTs, has maintained a very 
high operations tempo in the realm of SFA that persists today. Concerns about the U.S. 
Army sacrificing and misunderstanding its war-fighting mission in the name of SFA were 
voiced as early as 2015.229 
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Regardless of the U.S. Army’s efforts to formalize SFA in the organization with 
updated doctrine, mission statements, and a tailored force structure, it struggled to 
incentivize SFA. As aforementioned, the Army’s organizational essence has always been 
rooted in moving massive amounts of combat power to secure land dominance over a peer 
or near-peer adversary. A Soldier’s performance and potential in traditional combat roles 
is rewarded, whereas, an assignment in support of SFA is seen as peripheral and even career 
damaging. One primary concern, particularly in the officer corps, is that assignment to an 
SFA mission takes them off the career path for promotion.230 SFA assignments could last 
a year or more, which could cause an officer to fall behind their peers because critical time 
away from a “branch qualifying” position would, in some cases, exclude them from 
promoting to the next grade or higher-level position.231 Incentivizing officers to break 
from their traditional roles to serve in SFA assignments required adaption of the personnel 
management and promotion systems within the Army. The Army’s success with 
incentivizing SFAB assignments include: unit heraldry (distinctive unit patch and brown 
beret), assignment bonuses, and advanced promotions for volunteers who complete the 
rigorous selection and training requirements.232 The promotion rates for officers and non-
commissioned officers assigned to the first SFAB is very close to 100 percent.  
With updated doctrine, U.S. Army posture statements, years of SFA trial and error, 
and the enduring requirement to do SFA, the Army announced the creation of the SFAB 
concept in February 2017.233 The Army is planning to form six SFABs, the first of which 
began training at the newly established Military Advisor Training Academy located on Fort 
Benning in October 2017. The SFAB is composed of 500–600 Soldiers, all of whom 
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volunteer, score well on physical fitness and language tests, and are thoroughly vetted. 
Additionally, SFAB positions have been added to the list of key-developmental and branch 
qualifying positions in order to incentivize any assignment to the organization. The full-
time nature of the SFAB will eliminate the ad hoc nature in which the Army has approached 
SFA and provide, for the first time, multiple SFA units that are solely focused on that task. 
The first two SFABs will focus on the Middle East, with subsequent SFABs activating and 
focusing on the Pacific, Africa, and Europe. As a permanent addition to the U.S. Army, the 
SFAB will better meet strategic objectives of the NSS.234 
E. BALANCING OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO INCREASE 
READINESS AND MEET MISSION  
In 2003, the U.S. Army began to restructure itself from a Cold-War oriented 
division-based force into a modular and flexible BCT-based force, primarily to create a 
larger pool of units available to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan.235 The transformation 
from a Cold War Army structure to a War on Terror structure drove the modification of 
doctrine, ad hoc SFA organizations, and BCT unit training. Significant changes at the 
combat training centers (CTCs), which serve as the capstone training events for BCTs prior 
to deployment – shifted from force-on-force scenarios to complex COIN scenarios in 
support of stability operations.236 Deployment turnarounds were rotating units faster than 
the CTCs could train them, leading to a situation in which some BCTs deployed without a 
CTC exercise. At best, BCTs would arrive at a CTC at low levels of combat readiness and 
depart the month-long exercise at even lower levels, just prior to their deployment. While 
the Army has since made strides to increase readiness and massive combat deployments of 
BCTs have largely diminished since 2011, there are still readiness concerns throughout the 
Army.  
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Readiness refers to the ability of a unit to execute its range of assigned tasks.237 
The extent to which a unit’s personnel are equipped and trained, coupled with maintenance 
of equipment, spare parts, and stocks of consumables will contribute to the readiness 
level.238 The readiness levels of Army BCTs at the tactical level will have cascading 
effects all the way up to the strategic level. As noted in Chapter II, the U.S. defense strategy 
requires active engagement and forward presence in multiple regions simultaneously to 
deter or defeat aggression. An element of this strategy is known as the “two-war” 
requirement, which necessitates the ability to defeat two regional adversaries at once.239 
The BCTs are the standard deployable Army units that provide credible forward presence 
to deter aggression and assure allies in the Persian Gulf, Europe, and Pacific; defeat terror 
groups abroad through direct-military action and in-direct action such as SFA. 
Unfortunately, readiness of the U.S. military is still poor today. The National Defense Panel 
in 2014 found the DoD faces “major readiness shortfalls that will, absent a decisive reversal 
of course, create the possibility of a hollow force that loses its best people.”240 The reason 
for the readiness crisis is twofold: first, years of revolving-door conflict in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have placed a heavy burden on people and equipment; and second, the training 
requirements of these missions have been primarily SFA and counter-insurgency focused 
at the expense and hemorrhaging of traditional combat focused training.241 In 2017, the 
readiness challenges ensued as BCTs continued to fill SFA requirements; only 30 percent 
of all BCTs in the Army were considered ready to conduct large scale combined arms 
operations.242 
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In the most recent Army Posture Statement in 2016, Army leadership asserted its 
number one priority for the force would be to improve readiness.243 The Army Posture 
Statement goes on to assert that today’s Army leaders have grown up in an era of COIN 
operations and, therefore, lack experience in combined arms operations against a 
conventional enemy force.244 Four components of readiness are addressed: manning, 
training, equipping, and leader development. The problem identified is how to sustain 
Army operations abroad, which account for 40 percent of committed forces and 60 percent 
of emerging commitments, while also cultivating long term readiness in the four key 
areas.245 The Army finds itself in the predicament of righting the course on readiness and 
traditional combined arms focus while at the same time executing SFA missions as handed 
down from policymakers.   
Historically, SOF has been utilized to conduct SFA in places like El Salvador, 
Columbia, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. SOF’s focus has recently shifted away from 
SFA due to the increase in conventional forces conducting SFA and the requirement for 
SOF units to conduct unconventional warfare (UW).246 SOF is tasked to not only conduct 
SFA but also to conduct UW, leading to an overstretched and overtaxed SOF arm of the 
Army. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley (former SOF), has articulated 
his vision for SFA, “Special Forces has gone out and done what they’re supposed to do, 
and only they can do, which is train irregular forces…Special Forces does not train the 
Afghan National Army. They don’t train them now. They never have. Same thing in 
Iraq…there’s a reason for that.”247 General Milley’s assertion eludes to the nature of 
conventional SFA versus irregular SFA. SOF personnel are not the experts in conventional 
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warfighting functions like: logistics, intelligence, infantry, armor maneuver, and engineer 
support to operations. This is where the SFAB enters; an SFA force that is skilled in 
conventional warfare is best suited to train partner nations on its conventional security 
apparatus.  
F. CONCLUSION 
After sixteen years of protracted global conflict that has elicited military power 
projection and intervention from the U.S., the Army is now committed to SFA by creating 
six SFABs. The institutionalization of SFA in the form of the SFAB is in itself a tectonic 
innovation for the U.S. Army. The most recent NSS have articulated the strategic 
importance of SFA in fragile regions to pursue global security and protection of U.S. 
interests abroad. Since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army has taken an 
increasing role in SFA that spanned from 11-man MiTTs, AABs, and led to entire BCTs 
that were regionally aligned to support SFA not only in the Middle East but also Africa, 
the Pacific, and Europe.  
The approaches utilized by the U.S. Army have been ad hoc and reactive in the 
absence of doctrinal guidance. This is not to discredit the efforts of the U.S. military, as 
they operated without joint doctrine for years. Servicemembers never shrunk from the task 
as they adapted tactical processes that lead to organizational innovation; arguably, these 
men and women paved the way for future doctrine. BCT over-utilization for SFA missions 
had the unintended consequences of reduced readiness levels and perishing warfighting 
skills on the home front, and while deployed, BCT personnel did not have the skill set to 
properly conduct SFA. The Army’s innovative decision to establish SFABs will enable 
BCTs to focus on its warfighting mission, safeguard SFA institutional knowledge, cultivate 
an SFA culture, and ensure SFA missions are conducted with a higher degree of 
proficiency, dedication, and professionalism. The SFABs are to be the only organization 
in the U.S. Army fully focused on conducting SFA in the most remote and dark corners of 
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fragile regions. Much is to be seen from SFABs as the first SFAB (of six) is currently 
operating in Afghanistan for its inaugural mission.248 
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V. CONCLUSION  
A. FINDINGS 
This thesis has studied the adaptions and innovations in U.S. Army SFA design 
with the implementation of the SFAB; it also critically examined the strategic policies and 
procedures that aim to meet enduring U.S. security objectives. The thesis examined two 
hypotheses and introduced an evidence chain to suggest both hypotheses were confirmed. 
First, the hypothesis that SFABs are being established to increase the warfighting readiness 
of BCTs, reduce SFA burdens on Special Forces, and secure resources to meet enduring 
security requirements was confirmed by examining the over-utilization of BCTs to assist 
in post-conflict zones, current readiness levels, and enduring SFA requirements. Despite 
the recent reorientation to great power competition with Russia and China as the principal 
foci, the U.S. Army, recognizing that SSA is an enduring mission from policymakers, has 
decided to commit organizational capital on the SFAB establishment. Second, the 
hypothesis that ad-hoc approaches taken by the U.S. Army up to this point were in fact a 
by-product of disjointed policy was also confirmed. Large resource disparities between the 
DoS, DoD, and U.S.AID have been an uneven foundation on which SSA operates; with 
the DoD filling the resource gap, it has overemphasized SFA, which is their primary role 
in SSA.   
The U.S. Government has pursued an engaged and assertive stance since WWII to 
shape the global order in ways favorable to the U.S. and its allies. While the ways and 
means to achieve this end have shifted from decade to decade, the core guiding principles 
of the vision have been to secure free trade, the peaceful international order, and the 
prevention of hostile actors from dominating key regions. In pursuit of this vision, the U.S. 
has dedicated significant military and diplomatic capital in the form of overseas security 
commitments and forward deployed military power. National Security Strategies since 9/
11 have placed a great emphasis on stabilizing fragile regions and ungoverned spaces due 
to the consensus that malignant nonstate actors can leverage such spaces to build combat 
power and project it at U.S. national interests – and in the worst case, across the oceans to 
the mainland. Yet, the fragile state problem is one that is more nuanced than current 
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approaches have indicated. The policy of security cooperation and building foreign 
militaries is in fact a military led solution and is directly tied to securing ungoverned spaces, 
territory, and population within fragile states. 
This thesis offered a critical analysis of SSA policy and indicates that despite 
Executive and Congressional efforts to de-militarize U.S. foreign policy, loops holes such 
as the pseudo LOA, remain, which potentially give the DoD a streamlined procedure to 
conduct SFA that bypasses the whole-of-government approach. As SFA policy remains 
incoherent, SFA planners overlook the assumptions that militarized and technical 
approaches are best—automatically presuming measures of effectiveness to be the raw-
data of how many “capabilities” are transferred and how many soldiers get trained. An 
over-reliance on SFA has largely led to other SSA programs being neglected; SSR and DIB 
are lost in the mix – these programs are designed to build infrastructure and institutional 
capacity in fragile states; yet, these programs that can secure SFA gains are unkempt. 
Implications of poor SFA policy and plans can have unintended destabilizing effects in 
fragile regions if not better integrated with SSR and DIB. While the U.S. continues to throw 
money at the problem, policymakers fail to scrutinize the root and underlying causes for 
faltering SFA efforts. 
Theories of military innovation were examined to ascertain how the U.S. Army 
overcame organizational resistance to SFA. The U.S. Army’s decision to commit energy, 
capital, and man-power to a mission that is not consistent with the Army’s organizational 
essence and culture has not happened overnight. Like any organization, the Army has a 
doctrinal mission to do and will seek to sustain its core competencies, which are deeply 
rooted in its cultural identity; all of which SFA is largely inconsistent. This thesis found 
that the establishment of the SFAB originated from a blend of bottom-up tactical adaptions 
and top-down bureaucratic and organizational politics. As the research described, tactical 
adaptions to problem-sets in Iraq and Afghanistan heavily influenced innovations in 
doctrine and SFA organizations, while increasing operational requirements from 
policymakers necessitated the Army to overcome resistance to SFA.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The U.S. position in the world is unlikely to change anytime soon and the 
requirements to secure regions vital to national interests will remain a pillar of the national 
strategy. Previous researchers have largely arrived at the consensus that the U.S. 
government needs to evenly spread resources among the agencies and better ensure the 
whole-of-government approach is balanced to conduct SSA more effectively. This thesis 
will hone-in on SSR, DIB, and the pseudo LOA as areas for consideration. Broadly 
speaking, policymakers and SFA planners need to properly address planning assumptions 
and constraints in order to assess PN progress, ensure intent/interest alignment with the 
PN, and leverage all relevant agencies to achieve a shared and enduring security outcome.  
The security gains made by SFA can only be held if there is more emphasis placed 
on SSR and DIB. These programs are tailored to aid the PN’s safety, policing, justice, rule-
of-law, and defense institutions. Policymakers should consider these programs be planned 
for and integrated with SFA efforts; decision points should be established to indicate when 
the SSA plan with a PN will transition from SFA to SSR and DIB. Assessments of PN 
capacity and capability should be highly scrutinized prior to these efforts. The U.S. 
government can no longer afford to train PN militaries at the tactical level while largely 
neglecting the ministerial/departmental institutions that will ultimately employ the military 
power delivered by security cooperation programs like SFA and SA. Additionally, the SSR 
and DIB programs are inherently more diplomatic; a refocus on these programs will 
naturally rebalance the DoS and U.S.AID into the SSA program at large. Finally, 
policymakers should pay closer attention to the DoD authorities with the pseudo LOA, 
which has served as a quick-fix to larger SFA problems and widely done without DoS 
input. If SFA efforts continue to fail or produce stalemate in fragile regions, the larger 
program of SSA will lose the confidence of our allies and the those who pay for the 
program—the American people.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH  
Admittedly, this thesis narrowly focused on the SFA program of SSA and how the 
U.S. Army innovated its organization and doctrine to meet this enduring requirement. 
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However, the research of this thesis suggests that academia and think-tanks alike call for 
what is known as SSR and DIB. As such, future research should continue to look at these 
programs and how they can better be integrated with SFA efforts. For example, SSR and 
DIB program are inherently intrusive and would in many cases require the PN to vastly 
alter the way it conducts itself; perhaps this is why these programs are neglected for less-
intrusive SFA programs. However, would the U.S. government be best advised to not 
commit capital in the form of SFA if the PN is unwilling to accept changes and aid in the 
realms of SSR and DIB?  
Additionally, this thesis could not attempt to gauge how the SFAB is performing 
its mission. As this thesis is being written, the first SFAB is conducting operations in 
Afghanistan with follow on SFABs in training and preparing to deploy. As such, future 
research could look at how the U.S. Army continues to adapt its SFA organization and 
doctrine. For instance, discussion of creating an SFA division (SFAD) is already being 
entertained as the initial findings from the SFABs are showing a difficulty with integrating 
the brigade at the ministerial and institutional level.249 This topic could be of great value; 
as an SFAD would likely have a larger staff that could easily host DoS and U.S.AID 
liaisons, these touch-points could bridge the agency divide and bridge the gap between 
SSR, DIB, and SFA.   
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